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2Abstract
In this study a ranking is made of persons based on the number of years that the
persons have held positions in standard-setting bodies in Sweden during a period of
ten years. The positional approach assumes that people holding positions in units with
important functions are able to exercise influence. Applied to accounting standard-
setting units of importance are the actual standard-setting units. A decision to issue a
standard may be made by a board. However, this decision could be formal in
character. Another unit may be the actual standard-setter if that unit produces the
standards i.e. if it does everything but making the final formal decision. The number
of years that a person has held a position becomes interesting as the process of
producing accounting standards frequently goes on during a long period of time. This
study shows that there are many persons who have held a position. However, there is
a small group of persons who have held a position during many years and also in
more than one body. Thus, they have had the opportunity to exercise larger influence
than others. As these persons belong to various interest groups it becomes interesting
to discuss potential effects for these groups. Furthermore, a comparison is made
between the standard-setting bodies focusing the criteria used when selecting the
members of the actual standard-setting units. This study shows the importance of
considering political aspects when studying accounting standard-setting in Sweden.
1. INFLUENCE ON ACCOUNTING STANDARD SETTING
There is a legal basis for accounting in Sweden. Apart from the law there are non-
legal standards produced by a number of Swedish standard-setting bodies. Influence
on accounting standard-setting may be exercised in different ways. One way is by
participating at hearings arranged by standard-setters in order to give comments
orally. Furthermore, written comments can be given on exposure drafts or a person
can be active in the debate in journals etc. Another way is by holding a position in a
standard-setting body producing standards. For a person wanting to exercise influence
the most direct way to exercise influence is by holding a position in a standard-setting
body thus being a person who really participates in the decisions. The positions that
are available then become interesting.
3In Törnqvist, Lumsden and Marton (2000a) the organizational structure of the
Swedish standard-setters producing non-legal standards was studied, i.e. the inclusion
in the bodies of different types of units that are involved in the standard-setting
activities. In that study it was found that applied to accounting standard-setting, units
of importance are the actual standard-setting units. A decision to issue a standard may
be made by a board. However, this decision may be formal in character. Another unit
may be the actual standard-setter if that unit produces the standards i.e. if it does
everything but making the final formal decision. Thus, for a person wanting to
exercise influence it is important to hold a position in an actual standard-setting unit.
Horngren (1973) argues that the setting of accounting standards is as much a product
of political action as of flawless logic or empirical findings due to the need of
acceptance by the interest groups affected. In the US a new standard-setting body was
founded in the early 1970’s. The previous standard-setter had problems in getting the
producers of accounting information to follow non-legal standards. One of the reasons
for this lack of acceptance was that only auditors participated in the standard-setting
process. As a consequence, the opinions of other interest groups were not taken into
consideration (Van Riper, 1984, Zeff, 1984, Wyatt, 1991). As a result of this criticism
a new standard-setting body, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), was
founded in 1973 composed of persons with different backgrounds to avoid the
dominance of any particular interest group.
For a political organization the conflict between its members is important for the
legitimacy of both the organization and the individual members according to
Brunsson (1989). It seems reasonable that the possibility to exercise influence for a
4person belonging to an interest group in Sweden may be dependent upon the
composition of the actual standard setting unit i.e. which interests are represented and
the potential for conflict. Thus, consideration of politics becomes relevant when
studying the influence on accounting standard-setting in Sweden.
2. RESEARCH ISSUES
In a study of accounting standard-setting in Sweden in the beginning of the 1980’s the
focus was on identifying the most influential individuals (Jönsson, 1984). A
reputational approach was used. The same approach was also used in a study later in
the 1980’s (Sandin, 1988b).  In the reputational approach the researcher studies names
produced by knowledgeable informants (Scott, 1991). In these studies a questionnaire
was used as the basis for a ranking. The respondents gave the names of the persons
who they thought belonged to the accounting elite. The respondents also classified the
elite persons into the following four categories: accountant, auditor, opinion leader or
rule maker. The respondents could classify a person into more than one category. The
study by Jönsson (1984) resulted in a ranking list encompassing 39 persons who had
been judged as influential by the respondents.  In the ranking list there were five
persons who in comparison with the others on the list were judged as much more
influential as their names had been given by many of the respondents. Of the five at
the top all had been classified into all four categories. Three of the five at the top had
been classified into primarily the category auditors. The auditors were in majority at
the top of the ranking list and the group was also important when taking the total
number of persons on the ranking list into consideration. Three of the persons at the
top of the list were also at the top in the study by Sandin (1988b).
5A problem with the reputational approach is that it is not possible to distinguish
between having real power and having a reputation as powerful. Another problem
with the reputational approach is that it is static in the sense that a questionnaire is
sent or interviews are made at a certain point of time. Compared to the reputational
approach the positional approach can be more dynamic as it can be considered that a
person may have held a position during many years. A positional approach is defined
as a sampling from among occupants of particular formally defined positions (Scott,
1991). The number of years that a person has held a position becomes interesting
because the process of producing accounting standards frequently goes on during a
long period of time.
The reason why a positional approach was not used in the study made by Jönsson
(1984) was the aim of not disregarding that there could be authorities on accounting
declining participation in institutional procedures (Jönsson, 1985). Furthermore, there
could be newly arrived elite members who had not yet found a position and there
could be persons who had retired from an institutional position but maintaining their
influence anyway. However, it was argued that the standard-setting procedure is to a
large extent institutionalized.  Furthermore, it was argued that influential people are
likely to be found in institutional positions and the interest groups will probably
choose to be represented in those positions by their most respected members. The
results of the study confirmed these assumptions as the accounting elite had a very
good anchorage in the institutional structure involved in the accounting policy
formation process. Three of the five persons at the top had positions in important
standard-setting bodies.
6In Sweden a new standard-setting body, the Foundation of Good Accounting Practice,
was founded in the end of 1989. The Swedish Institute of Authorized Public
Accountants (FAR), the Swedish Accounting Standards Board (BFN) and the
Federation of Swedish Industries (SI) established this body jointly. Before 1989 the
FAR, with only auditors as members, had been the most important accounting
standard-setter in Sweden. When the new standard-setting organization was
established the aim was to involve different interest groups in the process of setting
accounting standards in order to increase the acceptance of standards. During the
1990’s this body has been the most productive Swedish standard-setter. Thus, it
becomes interesting to study which interest groups and persons that have exercised
influence on non-legal accounting standard-setting in Sweden during the 1990’s. The
aim is to apply a positional approach.
Regarding the opportunity to exercise influence the consideration of politics makes it
important to focus especially on potential effects for both the persons and the interest
groups of the availability of positions and the application of appointment principles.
3. RESEARCH DESIGN
When collecting information about positions available, Swedish standard-setters were
selected based on the production of non-legal standards during the period 1990 to
1999 and the availability of positions in the actual standard-setting units. The
application of these criteria for selection had the effect that four Swedish standard-
setters were selected.
7One of these is the private Association of Good Accounting Practice. The Association
is a result of a reconstruction in 1998 of the Foundation of Good Accounting Practice.
BFN was one of the founders in 1989 but was excluded in connection with the
reconstruction. There are two standard-setting units: the Financial Accounting
Standards Council (RR) and the Urgent Issues Task Force (UITF). The RR
emphasizes the self-regulation concept and has the objective of adjusting accounting
standards closely to international standards. In recent years adjustments have only
been made to the standards of the IASC. Due to the shareholder-orientation the
primary target group is listed companies. According to the rules on the Stockholm
Stock Exchange, listed companies are required to apply standards issued by the RR,
and if these are not applied information about the reasons for deviations must be
given. In practice, also non-listed companies have applied its standards. During the
1990’s the RR has been the most productive Swedish standard-setter. The standard-
setting function of the UITF is to issue interpretations rather than full standards.
Another standard-setter selected is the public BFN with the aim to issue standards that
are applicable to all companies. The importance of a broad representation of different
interests groups was emphasized when the body was established in the 1970’s. The
standards deal with technical book keeping matters and financial reporting.
The third standard-setting organization selected is the private Swedish Society of
Financial Analysts  (SFF) with the aim to issue standards that provide guidance for
financial analysts and companies. Furthermore, the aim is to influence the other
Swedish standard-setters by being a pressure group. The SFF has been producing
standards since the 1970’s.
8The fourth standard-setter selected is the private FAR. The FAR finished producing
standards when the Foundation of Good Accounting Practice was established in 1989.
An exception was made in 1996 when guidelines to be used when applying the
Financial Reporting Act were presented. Also, when needed, the FAR updates
standards that have been issued earlier. The FAR is a member of the IASC and has
during the 1990’s together with representatives for the auditor organization in other
Nordic countries held a position on the board of the IASC. The F R has been invited
to submit written comments on the exposure drafts issued by the IASC.
Besides the four standard-setters that were selected, there is also another body that has
produced standards during the period 1990 to 1999. This standard-setter is the public
Financial Supervisory Authority  (FI). However, in the actual standard-setting unit in
this body there are only FI personnel involved in the standard-setting. Therefore, the
FI was excluded in this study.
Also, in this study standard-setters producing legal standards have been excluded as
there are no actual standard-setting units in these authorities with positions available
to hold for persons belonging to various interest groups.
Information has been collected through interviews at the offices of the standard-
setting bodies in 1999. Questions were asked concerning the organization, principles
applied when appointing members of the actual standard-setting units and the
standard-setting process. This provides a motive for interviewing the administrative
heads. When it comes to collection of information the standard-setters have
contributed by providing various documents, published and internal.
9The persons holding positions were classified into eight different interest groups.
These groups could be regarded as interest groups or professional groups. In this
paper only the notation interest group will be used. The basis for the classification has
been the employer. With employer in this context is meant the following:
Auditors: The employer is a public accounting firm or a consultancy firm.
Financial analysts: The employer is a stockbroker company.
Accountants: The employer is a department in a company that produces
accounting information for financial reporting purposes.
Academics: The employer is a school or university.
Legal experts: The employer is the government.
Trade unions: The employer is a trade union.
Tax authorities: The employer is a tax authority.
The others: The employer is another one than those above or there are
several employers for one person.
It seems reasonable that a person may have a better opportunity to exercise influence
if that person participates in the decisions on standard-setting over a long period of
time. It also may take some time for a person to get a strong position in an actual
standard-setting unit. Furthermore, it seems reasonable that a person may have a
better opportunity to exercise influence on accounting standard-setting in Sweden if
that person participates in the standard-setting in more than one actual standard-
setting unit.
10
The basis when producing the ranking list has been the total number of positions a
person has held during the period 1990 to 1999. If a person for instance has held a
position in one actual standard-setting unit during the years 1990 to 1993 and
positions in two actual standard-setting units during the years 1994 to 1999 this
person will be regarded as having held 16 positions.
4. RESULTS
4.1. Appointment principles applied and positions available
In the four Swedish standard-setters selected in this study there were five actual
standard-setting units. The availability of positions in these units and how members of
these units have been appointed will be described below.
The Association of Good Accounting Practice has a board of trustees that supports the
standard-setting units. The board of trustees is not directly involved in the standard-
setting but is responsible for the financing and for appointing members to the actual
standard-setting units that are the RR and the UITF. The number of positions
available in the RR has been nine since the start in 1989. The UITF was established in
1994 and there have been five or six members since the start. There is no limitation
for neither the RR nor the UITF when it comes to how many years a person can be a
member. Four persons have been members of the RR since the start in 1989. Also in
UITF four persons have been members since the start in 1994. Four members of the
UITF have also been members of the RR.
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When appointing members to these units the aim has been to have a composition that
allows for the expression of different points of view. The members of the RR and the
UITF have been appointed based on expertise and on interest. The members are not
looked upon as representatives for interest groups. However, when the Foundation of
Good Accounting Practice was established the three founders, the FAR, the BFN and
the SI, nominated three members each to the RR. The effect was that in the RR there
were three auditors, three accountants and three persons with other professions,
among them an academic and a legal expert. When replacing a member of the RR the
new member has had the same background as the member replaced. Furthermore, the
members of the RR and the UITF are not employed full time by the Association and
have employers that belong to different interest groups. Therefore, in practice there
seems to be a small difference between the participation as an expert with an
employer belonging to a certain interest group and the participation as a representative
for an interest group.
The actual standard-setting unit within the BFN is the board. The appointment of
members of the board of the BFN is based on proposals from different interest groups.
Consideration is taken to skills and knowledge of accounting when a representative is
nominated. However, it is the Ministry of Justice that makes the formal decision. The
board of the BFN has had between ten and eleven members during the 1990’s. There
is no limitation when it comes to how many years a person can be a member of the
board and the members of the BFN are not employed full time by the standard-setter.
The actual standard-setting unit within the SFF is a committee. The board of the SFF
has the responsibility to appoint members to the committee. The members who have
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been appointed are financial analysts and persons belonging to the interest group
others. The number of members of the committee has varied between seven and
twelve during the 1990’s. There is no limitation when it comes to how many years a
person can be a member of the committee and the members are not employed full
time by this body either. The members of the committee do not get any financial
compensation at all from the SFF.
Also for the FAR the actual standard-setting unit is a committee. The board of the
FAR has the responsibility to appoint members to the committee. The members are
appointed based on expertise and interest in accounting. The committee has had six
members and there is no limitation when it comes to how many years a person can be
a member of the committee. All members are auditors who are not employed full time
by the FAR. In fact, they do not get any financial compensation from the FAR.
One thing that is common for the Swedish standard-setters is that none has a limit for
how many years a person can serve as a member of the actual standard-setting unit.
Therefore, some persons in the RR, the BFN, the SFF and the FAR have been
members of the actual standard-setting unit during the whole period 1990 to 1999.
However, there are standard-setting bodies in other countries that have a limit when it
comes to how many years a person can be a member of the standard-setting unit
(Miller et al, 1998) in the aim of making it possible for new persons to exercise
influence on accounting issues. One reason why Swedish standard-setters do not have
a time limit may be difficulties in attracting competent persons who are willing to
work part time for the standard-setters with a very limited or no financial
compensation.
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Another thing that is common for the four Swedish standard-setters selected is that the
members of the actual standard-setting units are not employed full time by the
standard-setter. Standard-setting bodies in other countries e.g. the FASB and the ASB
(Beresford, 1995) apply the principle that persons must be independent during the
period when they are members of a standard-setting unit. The members of the
standard-setting units are employed by the standard-setter and cannot have any
affiliation with another employer. However, the Swedish standard-setters do not have
such a financial situation that would make it possible to have members employed full
time.
For the period 1990 to 1999 Table 1 shows how many persons belonging to various
interest groups that have been members of the five actual standard-setting units during
one year. In the RR nine positions have been available to hold during each year. It is
interesting to note that for the accountants three positions have been available to hold
in the RR each year but during some years only one accountant has actually held a
position. For an interest group to exercise influence it seems important that persons
belonging to that group also hold the positions available. In another study of
accounting standard-setting in Sweden (Törnqvist et al, 2000b) it was found that
among the members of the board of the BFN the accountants had a low degree of
attendance at meetings.
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE
Persons belonging to the interest group auditors or others have participated in the
standard-setting in four of the five actual standard-setting units. In contrast persons
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belonging to the interest groups financial analysts, trade unions and tax authorities
have been members of one actual standard-setting unit only.
Table 1 also shows the number of positions one person belonging to a certain interest
group could have held in one or more actual standard-setting units during the period
1990 to 1999. For persons belonging to the interest group auditors or others it has
been possible to hold 36 positions in total. However, for the financial analysts and
persons belonging to the interest groups trade unions and tax authorities the maximum
has been ten positions.
If instead a comparison is made between the interest groups Table 1 shows that
persons belonging to the interest group auditors have held 131 positions in total in
four actual standard-setting units during the period 1990 to 1999. This means that the
auditors have participated in the standard-setting to a much higher degree than the
other interest groups. One explanation is that only auditors are members of the actual
standard-setting unit in the FAR. But even if these 60 positions are excluded the
number of positions held is much higher compared to the other groups except the
financial analysts. For the financial analysts a high number of positions have been
available each year in the actual standard-setting unit in the SFF. The total number of
positions that persons belonging to various interest groups have held in the five actual
standard-setting units amount to 375 for the period 1990 to 1999.
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4.2. Ranking of persons holding positions
There are 58 persons who have participated in the standard-setting by holding
positions in or more actual standard-setting units during the period 1990 to 1999.
Table 2 shows the result of ranking the persons according to the total number of
positions the persons have held.
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE
What is common for the persons who are at the top of the list, the first seven persons
in this study, is that they have been members in more than one actual standard-setting
unit. Five of them have been members of the RR. The seven persons at the top of the
list seem to have had opportunities over time to exercise influence on many types of
accounting issues.  Two of the seven persons belong to the group others, three are
auditors, one is an accountant and one is an academic. Thus, four of the eight interest
groups are represented.
Four auditors, four financial analysts, one person belonging to the interest group
others, one accountant and one person belonging to the group trade unions have
participated in one of the actual standard-setting units during the whole period 1990 to
1999. The person with the highest ranking, belonging to the group others, has been a
member every year during the period 1990 to 1999 of two actual standard-setting
units. The representatives for the tax authorities have participated during six years at
most. The total number of positions for those persons at the top who belong to the
interest groups auditors, accountants and academics is much higher compared to the
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average number of positions for persons belonging to these groups. For the auditors
17, 16 and 12 positions can be compared with an average of seven positions. For the
accountant 15 positions can be compared with an average of six positions and for the
academic 13 positions can be compared with six positions. However, for the group
others the 13 positions for one of them at the top is lower than the average for this
group as there are only three persons belonging to the group others and the one at the
top of the list has held 26 positions.
Table 2 also shows the total number of positions held in relation to the total number of
positions that could have been held by one person belonging to a certain interest
group during the period 1990 to 1999. The ratio is 1.0 for four financial analysts and
one representative for trade unions. For the financial analysts this means that the
persons have held a position every year during the period 1990 to 1999 in the actual
standard-setting unit in the SFF, and that they have not had the opportunity to hold
positions in other actual standard-setting units. For the person, classified into the
group others, that was ranked highest the ratio is 0.72. For the others among the seven
at the top it varies between 0.65 for the academic, 0.58 for the accountant, 0.47, 0.44
and 0.33 for the auditors and is finally 0.36 for another person classified into the
group others. It is thus easier for a person to have an opportunity to exercise influence
if that person belongs to such an interest group that has a high number of positions
available to hold for the persons belonging to the group.
In the studies by Jönsson (1984) and Sandin (1988b) a reputational approach was used
when producing a ranking list. In this study the positional approach has been used
instead. In Table 3 the comparison of the ranking lists in the three studies is restricted
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to the persons at the top of the lists, and in the studies by Jönsson (1984) and Sandin
(1988b) there was a group of five persons at the top. In these studies the respondents
classified the elite persons into the following four categories: accountant, auditor,
opinion leader or rule maker. In table 3 the employer has been used instead and the
persons at the top of the lists have been classified into those interest groups that have
been used in the study for the period 1990 to 1999 in order to facilitate the
comparison.
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE
Table 3 shows that there are three auditors, one academic and one person belonging to
the group others at the top of the ranking list in the study by Jönsson (1984). In the
study by Sandin (1988b) there are instead three auditors, one academic and one
person belonging to the group others. Among the seven persons at the top of the list
for the period 1990 to 1999 there are three auditors, two persons belonging to the
interest group others, one accountant and one academic.
An auditor was ranked highest in the two studies in the 1980’s while a person
belonging to the group others got the highest ranking for the period 1990 to 1999.
However, in this context it should be noted that Rolf Rundfelt who has been classified
into the group others in this study has been employed for many years as a consultant
at a public accounting firm. But he has also been employed part time as a university
professor and has earlier been employed by the SI in the 1980’s when he started a
reference group for accounting issues. Also the other person classified into the group
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others, Hans Edenhammar, has been an auditor for many years before he worked as a
journalist and was later employed by the Stockholm Stock Exchange.
Also, the comparison of the three studies shows that it is only for the period 1990 to
1999 that a person belonging to the interest group accountants is included among the
persons at the top of the ranking list. This is interesting as the standard-setter that was
established in 1989, the Foundation of Good Accounting Practice, had the aim of
obtaining better acceptance from the producers of accounting information.
Since some of the persons at the top 1980 and 1987 have participated for many years
in standard-setting organizations the reputation of being influential may have reflected
that a person has held a position in a standard-setting unit during many years.
However, in the ranking list of the first study there are two persons who have been
judged as influential but who have not held positions in standard-setting
organizations. Those persons could not have been included at the top if a positional
approach had been used. One of them is an academic, Sven-Erik Johansson, a
professor at the Stockholm School of Economics. In this context it is interesting to
note that his colleague at the same school and co-author of some publications,
professor Lars Östman, is included among those at the top of the list for the period
1990 to 1999. The other one is Boris Carlsson who has been administrative head at
the BFN. As the administrative heads have not held positions in actual standard-
setting units they have not been included in the study for the period 1990 to 1999.
One person, Hans Edenhammar, is included among those at the top in all three
studies. Also five of the other six persons that are at the top for the period 1990 to
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1999 have been included in the ranking list in at least one of the earlier studies,
however not at the top of the list. The ranking for these persons in 1980 and 1987 are
as follows: Rolf Rundfelt 9 and 7, Lennart Huldén 21 and 6, Sigvard Heurlin 18 in
1987, Lars Ohlsson-Leijon 15 in 1987 and Lars Östman 26 and 8 (Jönsson, 1984 and
Sandin, 1988a). This shows that it may take some time to get a high ranking.
However, for the period 1990 to 1999 there are two persons who have not held
positions during many years but who ought to have been rather influential. One of
them is Peter Malmqvist, a financial analyst, who has been very active in terms of
presentations at conferences and publications. He has been a member of the actual
standard-setting unit in the SFF during three years. The other one is Margit Knutsson.
She has been a member of the RR during four years. But she is also employed as an
accounting expert at the SI being the one that arranges meetings for discussions of
exposure drafts within the reference group of the SI. As the positional approach has
been applied these persons have got a rather low ranking. It is of course hard to
speculate about which ranking they would have achieved if a reputation l approach
had been used instead. As mentioned above it has taken some time for the persons at
the top of the list to get a high ranking.
5. CONCLUSIONS
The Swedish standard-setters studied are all producing non-legal standards and the
acceptance by interested parties is important. According to H ngren (1973)
accounting standard-setting is as much a product of political action as of logic or
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empirical findings due to the need of acceptance by the interest groups affected.
Brunsson (1989) argues that for a political organization the conflict between members
is important for the legitimacy of both the organization and the individual members.
Therefore, it may be easier to achieve acceptance if there is such a composition of the
actual standard-setting unit that positions are available for persons representing
various interest groups and evenly distributed.
The criteria for selection used when appointing members has been expertise and
interest. In the RR the members are not regarded as representatives for specific
interest groups. However, in practice there seems to be a small difference between the
participation as an expert with an employer belonging to a certain interest group and
the participation as a representative for an interest group.
This study shows that in the RR there have been positions available to hold for
persons belonging to five interest groups. For the auditors three positions have been
available to hold.  Also for the accountants three positions have been available while
persons belonging to the other three groups have each had one position available to
hold.  In the BFN positions have been available for seven interest groups and most of
the representatives for these groups have held up to two positions per year. The
auditors have held between two and three positions, the group others one and the tax
authorities one. Thus, in the BFN more interest groups have been represented and the
distribution of positions has been more even compared to the RR. Regarding effects
for the legitimacy it is interesting to note that, since January 2000, the national
government has, through the BFN, the main responsibility in Sweden for the
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development of good accounting practice, except for the financial service companies,
in which case the FI has the right to issue standards (FAR, 1999).
Auditors have participated in the standard-setting to a much higher extent than the
other interest groups. Even if the positions in the FAR are excluded auditors have held
a higher number of positions than most of the other interest groups. Thus, even if the
FAR finished producing standards in 1989 the auditors still have had good
opportunities to exercise influence on accounting standard-setting in Sweden during
the 1990’s. Especially, as there is another group that during some years have not even
taken the opportunity to exercise influence by having several persons from the group
participating as members of an actual standard-setting unit. Persons belonging to the
group accountants have during some years held only one of the three positions
available for accountants in the RR.
What is common for the Swedish standard-setters studied, concerning appointment
principles applied, is that there is no limitation when it comes to how many years a
person can be a member of an actual standard-setting unit. Furthermore, none of the
members has been employed full time by the standard-setters due to lack of financial
resources.
The result in terms of ranking for the period 1990 to 1999 shows that it is important
for a person belonging to a certain interest group that the interest group is represented
in many standard-setters. The seven persons at the top of the list have all been
members of more than one actual standard-setting unit and they have held more than
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ten positions in total. This study also shows that it may take some to get a high
ranking.
Two studies of influence on accounting standard-setting in Sweden were made in the
1980’s. In both of them a reputational approach was used. In this study a positional
approach has been used instead. In all three studies there is a group of five or seven
persons at the top of the list with such characteristics that this group deviates from the
others on the ranking lists. There are three auditors at the top in the three studies.
However, only for the period 1990 to 1999 there is an accountant among those at the
top. This may be an effect of the aim, when a new standard-setting body was founded
in 1989, to have a broader participation of interest groups than earlier in order to
increase the acceptance among the producers of accounting information.
In Jönsson (1985) some of the problems with the reputational approach were
commented upon. Besides being static in character it becomes difficult when applying
this approach to distinguish between having real power and having a reputation as
powerful. When the positional approach is applied other problems arise. The ranking
does not show to which extent the persons who have held positions have really
influenced the decisions taken in the actual standard-setting units. Furthermore, the
number of positions available in an actual standard-setting unit e.g. the high number
of positions in the SFF has affected the ranking in such a way that many persons have
been included.
However, compared to the reputational approach the positional approach is objective
in character as the ranking is based on documentation about positions held by certain
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persons. Furthermore, the reputational approach is focused on the persons even if the
persons are classified into various interest groups while the positional approach makes
it possible to focus on both the persons and the interest groups. This is an advantage
as it is important to consider political aspects when studying influence on accounting
standard-setting in Sweden.
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Table 1. Availability of positions in actual standard setting units  during  the period 1990-1999
Interest groups RR UITF BFN SFF FAR
Total number of positions that
could have been held by one







Auditors 3 2 2-3 - 6 36 131
The others 1 1 1 2 - 36 46
Accountants 1-3 1-2 1-2 - 26 46
Legal experts 1 - 2 - - 21 30
Academics 1 0-1 0-2 - 20 22
Financial analysts- - - 5-10 - 10 71
Trade unions - - 1-2 - - 10 19




7-9 5-6 10-11 7-12 6
25











Rolf Rundfelt             (10 RR+6 UITF+10 SFF) 26 0.72 Others RR+UITF+SFF
Lennart Huldén          (10RR+6 UITF+ 1 FAR) 17 0.47 Auditors RR+UITF+FAR
Sigvard Heurlin                      (10 RR+ 6 UITF ) 16 0.44 Auditors RR+UITF
Lars Ohlsson-Leijon  (10 RR+4 UITF+1 BFN) 15 0.58 Accountants RR+UITF+BFN
Hans Edenhammar              (10 SFF+3 BFN) 13 0.36 Others SFF+BFN
Lars Östman            (7 RR + 2 UITF + 4 BFN ) 13 0.65 Academics RR+UITF+BFN
Bo Engström                       (9 FAR+3 BFN) 12 0.33 Auditors FAR+BFN
Carl-Eric Bohlin 10 0.27 Auditors FAR
Mikael Gunnarsson 10 1.00 Financial analysts SFF
Björn Jansson 10 1.00 Financial analysts SFF
Per Jungqvist 10 1.00 Financial analysts SFF
Connie Ljung 10 1.00 Auditors BFN
Jan-Eric Moreau 10 1.00 Trade unions BFN
Ulf Strömsten 10 1.00 Financial analysts SFF
Olof Cederberg 9 0.25 Auditors FAR
Jan Eriksson 9 0.25 Auditors RR
Gösta Karlsson 9 0.90 Trade unions BFN
Peter Markborn 9 0.25 Auditors FAR
Åke Näsman 9 0.25 Auditors FAR
Siv Berlin 8 0.22 Auditors BFN
Bengt Rydén 7 0.19 Others BFN
Gustav Sandström 7 0.35 Legal experts BFN
Per Thorell 7 0.35 Legal experts RR
Leif Borin 6 0.23 Accountants UITF
Gunnar Johansson 6 0.23 Accountants BFN
Jan Svanberg 6 0.30 Legal experts BFN
Anders Thorell 6 0.60 Tax authorities BFN
Stig von Bahr 5 0.25 Legal experts BFN
Jan Blomberg 5 0.19 Accountants RR
Ulf Fahlgren 5 0.50 Financial analysts SFF
Sven-Erik Johansson 5 0.24 Academics RR
Hans Lindblad 5 0.19 Accountants RR
Kerstin Plogner 5 0.14 Auditors BFN
Dennis Svensson 5 0.14 Auditors FAR
Erik Danielsson 4 0.11 Auditors BFN
Olle Gunnarsson 4 0.11 Auditors FAR
Margit Knutsson 4 0.20 Legal experts RR
Anders Rydin 4 0.40 Financial analysts SFF
Jan Siling 4 0.15 Accountants RR
Patrik Tillman 4 0.40 Financial analysts SFF
Per Afrell 3 0.30 Financial analysts SFF
Annika Andersson 3 0.30 Financial analysts SFF
Pontus Ekman 3 0.30 Financial analysts SFF
Ingrid Engshagen 3 0.14 Academics BFN
Sten Holmberg 3 0.30 Financial analysts SFF
Peter Malmqvist 3 0.30 Financial analysts SFF
Åke Stavling 3 0.12 Accountants BFN
Rolf Törnqvist 3 0.30 Tax authorities BFN
Lars Höglund 2 0.20 Financial analysts SFF
Sven-Åke Svenberg 2 0.08 Accountants RR
Peter Andrén 1 0.05 Legal experts BFN
Clas Blix 1 0.03 Auditors FAR
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Bo Fridman 1 0.03 Auditors FAR
Per Hanner 1 0.03 Auditors RR
Bo Norrman 1 0.10 Tax authorities BFN
Thomas Mossberg 1 0.10 Financial analysts SFF
Eva Sandström 1 0.03 Auditors BFN
Agneta Stark 1 0.05 Academics BFN
* Number of positions held by one person in one or more actual standard-setting units during
the period 1990 to 1999
** Number of positions held by one person in relation to the number of positions that could have
been held by the person, a number that varies between the interest groups.
Table 3. Persons at the op of the ranking lists and the inter st groups that hese persons belong to








Per Hanner Aud. Per Hanner Aud. Rolf Rundfelt Others
Hans Edenhammar Aud. Sven-Erik Johansson Acad. Lennart Huldén Aud.
Sven-Erik Johansson Acad. Bo Fridman Aud. Hans Edenhammar Others
Boris Carlsson Others Hans Edenhammar Others Sigvard Heurlin Aud.
Sune Carlsson Aud. Bertil Edlund Aud. Lars Ohlsson -Leijon Account.
Lars Östman Acad.
Bo Engström Aud.
* Results presented by Jönsson (1984).
** Results presented by Sandin (1988b).
***  The classification is based on the employer of the persons.
